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Abstract  
 
We examine the relations between national cultures, the multinationality of the firm and 
its holdings of cash. We develop several hypotheses from well known corporate finance 
theories and theories of the multinational firm, positing that cultural factors as well as the 
degree of multinationality of firms influence their decisions to hold cash. In particular, 
firms in countries with high uncertainty avoidance, as a national culture, hold more cash 
as a way to hedge against undesired states of nature. Furthermore, as a reflection of their 
longer business cycles, multinational firms typically hold more cash. At the same time, 
however, the multinationality of the firm moderates the effects of culture on the firm’s 
decision to hold liquid assets. Based on a large panel of firms in forty countries, we 
present evidence consistent with these hypotheses. While firms in countries with high 
levels of uncertainty avoidance tend to hold more cash, the degree of multinationality of 
the firm is positively correlated with holdings of cash. On the other hand, the effect of 
national culture on firm’s cash holdings is lower for multinationals. 
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Introduction  
One of the most important financial decisions the firm makes is how much cash to hold as a 
buffer against future uncertainty.  Firms hold a significant portion of their assets in the form of cash. 
The largest corporations around the world reported a total of $1.5 trillion in liquid cash, almost 9 
percent of the book value of their assets, at the end of 1998 (see, Dittmar et al. (2003)).  Corporate 
cash holdings of the S&P 500 companies alone amount to $716 billion in 1994 (Opler et al. (1999)). 
Microsoft reported a cash balance of $60 billion on its 2004 fourth quarter earnings announcement, 
and is reported to have accumulated cash at a rate of $1 billion per month. In April of 2006, Apple 
Computer had 59% of its totals assets in the form of cash and short term investments. Moreover, there 
appears to be a significant variation in liquid asset holdings across firms as well as across countries.  
Dittmar et al. (2003) report the median cash-holdings in the U.S. to be $19.5 million per firm as 
compared with $31.5 million in Switzerland.  Cash holdings range from a mere 0.3 percent of assets in 
Kenya to 15.5 percent in Japan to 29.6 percent in Egypt.    
What explains the cross-sectional variations in liquid-asset holdings across firms and 
countries? In this paper, we propose to answer the question based on the national culture in which the 
firm resides in, and the degree of its internationalization. We develop several hypotheses of how 
culture and multinationality interact with each other in influencing corporate holdings of cash, while 
controlling for all other known determinants.  Specifically, we conjecture that firms in countries high 
on uncertainty avoidance, as a cultural dimension, will hold more cash.  Additionally, and against 
commonly held views in cash management, firms high in their degree of internationalization will hold 
more liquid assets.  On the other hand, we propose that the impact of culture on firm liquidity should 
be moderated by the degree of the firm’s multinationality. We test these hypotheses on a sample of 
firms from 40 countries and almost 70 thousand firm-year observations over the period 1990 through 
2000.     3
The paper provides a number of important contributions to the literature on firm liquidity. First, 
based on a detailed cross-country panel, we document that, in addition to the firm-level determinants 
of liquidity, national culture explains a significant portion of the cross-country variations in liquidity.  
Second, we identify and document that, in spite of common cash pooling practices, the 
multinationality of the firm also contributes to its greater holdings of cash. Third, we, however, report 
that the multinationality of the firm interacts with national culture in moderating the effect of the latter 
on the firm’s cash holdings.  Fourth, we document that once controlling for multinationality and 
national culture, some results reported in previous research do not seem to hold. Our paper identifies 
new and economically important determinants of liquid asset holdings, both at the firm and country 
levels after controlling for all determinants identified in the extant literature (e.g., Opler et al. (1999) 
and Pinkowitz et al. (2003)). In a broader sense, we introduce an interdisciplinary perspective in 
understanding firm holdings of liquidity, encompassing the literatures in finance, culture and the 
theories of the multinational firm from international business.  
One of the motives for holding cash, advanced in the finance literature, is a precautionary one 
of avoiding the risks and costs of shortage of liquidity.  Firms hold liquid assets to provide a buffer to 
meet unexpected contingencies.  Firms’ liquid asset holdings increase with increases in its operational 
and macroeconomic uncertainty (see, e.g., Keynes (1934) and Baum et al. (2005) for recent evidence).  
We argue that the degree to which firm managers respond to uncertainty depends  also on their cultural 
predisposition towards it.  Individuals vary in their perception as well as tolerance of uncertainty.  A 
large body of literature in psychology reports that an individual’s perception of uncertainty and her 
coping mechanisms are influenced significantly by the national culture in which the individual resides. 
Hofstede (2001), for example, documents a wide variation in the perceived level of uncertainty and the 
extent of uncertainty avoidance behavior across national cultures.  We, therefore, propose that, ceteris 
paribus, firms residing in a country with high level of uncertainty avoidance, as a cultural attribute,   4
would hold more liquid assets, and hence cash, on average.    
Theories of the multinational enterprise provide us with rationale for the existence of the MNC 
as distinct from domestic firms.  Multinationals are different, because they are exposed to new cultures 
and business practices because of their frequent foreign contacts. According to Kogut and Zander 
(1993), firms operating in diverse national settings develop a richer knowledge base and stronger 
technological capabilities than firms that are exposed only to domestic markets. As a result, firms and 
managers that remain in only one country will have a less rich pool of experiences upon which to base 
their decisions. Thus, the goals and decisions of a purely domestic firm with domestic managers will 
only reflect the values of the society in which it exists. These domestic firms lack experiential 
knowledge of foreign markets and international competition. Under this isolation, managers and firms 
will likely incorporate only the local culture into their decisions, behaviors and processes. Thus, we 
conjecture that an increase in the multinationality or internationalization of the firm reduces the impact 
of (local) national culture on firm behavior, including its holdings of liquid assets such as cash.  
We examine empirically the relations among national culture, multinationality and corporate 
liquid-asset holdings using data from a large panel of firms across 40 countries for the period 1990 
through 2000.  We find strong evidence consistent with our hypotheses. First, we find that national 
culture – particularly, uncertainty avoidance as a cultural attribute – is an economically and 
statistically significant predictor of firms’ liquid asset holdings. Firms in countries with high 
uncertainty avoidance hold more liquid assets. A one standard deviation change in the uncertainty 
avoidance index across countries produces a five percent increase in liquid assets holdings. Second, 
the degree of multinationality of the firm increases its holdings of liquid assets. Third, the predictive 
power of culture as an explanatory variable of liquid asset holdings decreases with the degree of 
internationalization of the firm. Indeed, the interaction between the culture proxy and multinationality 
is negative.     5
These findings have important implications for future research. First, the evidence that 
multinational firms’ decisions are different from domestic firms’ implies that cross-country 
comparisons should account for the multinationality of the firms in their samples. Second, while our 
evidence indicates that culture affects corporate financial decisions, it also underscores that national 
culture does not affect all firms in the same way. Because of the interaction, the impact of national 
culture is more pronounced for firms with less foreign exposure. The implication is that the effects of 
culture on the financial decisions of the firm should take into account the moderating effects of 
multinationality.  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief summary 
of the motivation and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and the empirical results, 
and section 4 provides concluding remarks.  
 
 
Theoretical background and hypotheses  
Three main lines of literature have motivated the paper. The first is research on the 
determinants of corporate liquid asset holdings. The second relates to culture and its possible influence 
on financial decisions of the firm. The third line of research is theories of the multinational firm from 
the international business literature.  This section provides a brief synthesis of these literatures and 
develops testable hypotheses.  
Corporate liquid holdings and its determinants  
Models explaining liquid holdings  
For a value-maximizing manager, the level of liquid assets to hold solely depends on the 
marginal costs and benefits of each additional dollar on hand.  There is an optimal level of liquid-asset 
holding that reflects the tradeoff between these costs and benefits. Early models such as the ones   6
                                                
presented by Keynes (1934) and Baumol (1952) adopt this view and take an inventory approach to the 
problem. In these models, liquid assets are held because they provide two main benefits; the first use 
of liquid assets is transactional. Liquid assets are cheaper to use than fixed assets to finance daily 
operations
2. The second use of liquid assets is precautionary; firms hold cash as a buffer against 
undesired states of nature. On the other hand, holding liquid assets entails an opportunity cost because 
of the liquidity premium.   
A third reason, not explicitly included in previous models, for firms to hold cash is for 
speculative uses. Firms can easily deploy liquid assets to take advantage of opportunities.  Myers and 
Majluf (1984) propose a model in which there is asymmetric information between the owner 
manager and the equity market. The owner manager knows the real value of assets in place but the 
equity market does not. The choice of financing by the firm becomes a signal of the value of the 
assets. Under this model, the firm will hold cash as a financial slack so that it can be used to finance 
investments when equity or debt financing is too expensive. The model’s key prediction is a 
“pecking” order in corporate financing, in which cash will always be preferred to debt and equity.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that managers will prefer holding liquid assets to debt or 
equity because cash increases their discretion while debt and equity are accompanied by external 
monitoring. Jensen (1986) proposes that managers of firms with free cash flow will likely engage in 
value decreasing acquisitions rather than increasing dividends to shareholders.   
The predictions of these classic models of firm-liquidity are summarized in Table I. In general, 
firm-level liquid asset holdings appear to be motivated by capital market imperfections.  Otherwise, 
with perfect capital markets, firms will hold liquid assets only to cover normal operations. If cash is 
 
2 This used to be the shoe sole argument; it is less expensive to hold some level of liquid assets than to go to the bank 
every time money is needed.  
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needed for other purposes, it can be raised at no cost in the form of debt or equity.  Hedging via 
accumulation of liquid assets makes sense only if access to capital markets is costly due to 
imperfections, including transaction costs, agency problems and informational asymmetry. The models 
provide specific predictions of corporate holdings of liquid assets that depend on the specific market 
imperfection considered by the respective model.  
 
 
Firm-level determinants of liquid holdings - evidence  
Opler et al. (1999) provide an extensive empirical analysis of the determinants of liquid assets 
at the firm level. Their study concentrates on US firms; their sample is comprised of almost 90 
thousand firm-year observations over the period 1971 through 1994. In particular, focusing on firm 
cash-holdings, they provide evidence that supports both the static tradeoff and the agency theory 
models. They find that firms with strong growth opportunities, in general, hold more cash. Firms that 
invest more (high capital expenses) and research more tend to hold more liquid assets. Alternatively, 
firms with greater access to capital markets such as large firms (with less asymmetric information 
problems) hold lower levels of cash.  Additionally, they find that leverage is negatively correlated with 
cash holdings.  
Country-level determinants of liquid holdings - evidence  
More recently, Pinkowitz et al. (2003) have expanded the extant evidence to include 
determinants of cross-country differences in cash holdings of firms. They find that country specific 
characteristics such as country risk, and corruption explain a significant portion of the cross-country 
variation in cash holdings. They argue that countries with high country-risk and corruption may 
impose higher agency costs on firms.  The low quality of governmental, financial and / or regulatory 
institutions could entice managers to divert corporate resources for private benefits. Since liquid assets   8
                                                
could be more easily diverted, Pinkowitz et al. (2003) argue that firms in countries with high country-
risk should hold more cash.   Based on a sample of firms in 35 countries over the period 1988 through 
1999, they find that the level of cash-holdings is positively correlated with country risk and corruption.  
They also report inflation as having a negative impact on cash holdings.  Firms prefer to lower their 
holdings of cash in anticipation of it losing value during inflation.  
Culture and Finance  
Culture  
The most common operationalization of culture is to view it as a value system. Values can be 
defined as “… an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is 
personally or socially preferable to an opposite” (Rokeach (1973). Under this framework, culture can 
then be defined as a set of rules and standards abstracted from individuals’ values (Parson and Shils 
(1951)), or as “… patterned ways of thinking feeling and reacting…” (Kluckhohn (1954)) or as “… 
the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of a group from another 
(Hofstede (2001)).   
Undoubtedly the most popular and frequently cited work on culture as a value system is 
Hofstede (1980, 2001)
3. The popularity of the Hofstede’s concepts of culture in academia cannot be 
underestimated.  Appendix I summarizes the number of business related journal articles that have 
“Culture’s Consequences” in their references
4. As a former IBM employee, Geert Hofstede 
 
3 Since the publication of the first edition of Cultures Consequences, many researchers have successfully replicated 
Hofstede’s findings. For example, Søndergaard (1994) finds support in a review of 61 replications of different 
characteristics. Hoppe (1990), using the same IBM questionnaire on a sample of business leaders of European countries, 
was able to obtain the same dimensions. The validity of Hofstede’s findings has also been corroborated by studies using 
different samples. For example Helmreich and Wilhelm (1998) and Merritt (1998) using a sample of 15,000 airline pilots 
from 23 countries found that pilots replicated the IBM country score-differences for 3 of the 4 dimensions. Other non 
academic studies (conducted by market research firms) have corroborated Hofstede’s findings. For example Inter/View 
International used the Values Survey Module 1994 which included a consumer panel survey across 15 European countries.  
 
4 The fame of Hofstede’s dimensions does not imply that his work is exempt of criticism. The main criticisms to   9
                                                                                                                                                                      
administered 117,000 questionnaires in 66 countries during 1967 through 1973. Even though the 
research project was designed as a management tool and not as an effort to measure world values, it 
provided a unique experimental setting where samples could be matched to control for many factors 
that could induce to error. A key feature of the study is that, having matched organization, 
occupation, gender and age of the respondents, then, all other differences can be attributed to national 
culture differences. Hofstede’s study derived five dimensions of culture that are deemed universal 
and centered over basic problems that all societies must confront but on which their answers may 
vary. The dimensions identified by Hofstede are: Power distance, relating to how society deals with 
human inequality; Uncertainty avoidance, which is related to the level of stress in a society while 
confronted with unknown future; Individualism versus collectivism, associated with how individuals 
are integrated to groups; Masculinity versus femininity, related to the division of emotional roles 
between men and women; Long-term versus short-term orientation, related to people’s choice of 
focus between the future or the present.  While all dimensions of culture are available to the 
manager, they need not to influence the cash holding decision. Culture is shared but also situational; 
people do not use all five dimensions in every situation they face. Masculinity and power distance 
are helpful in explaining other business practices such as differences in organizational structures in 
cross-country studies, but do not have a clear theoretical implication for liquid asset holdings.  
There are several mechanisms through which culture affects behavior. According to Schwartz 
 
Hofstede’s works have been presented by McSweeney (2002) and Baskerville (2003). In essence, both studies argue that 
national borders should not be equated to cultures, and that work values cannot be equated to national values. McSweeney 
(2002) questions the methodology and assumptions used by Hofstede, noting how the IBM responses can shed light about 
work values but not necessarily about overall or general values since they were work-related questions administered in the 
formal work place. Baskerville (2003) argues that the Hofstede’s cultural dimensions may be “embedded” in socio-
economical data. For example, Power Distance is highly correlated with education while Uncertainty Avoidance is highly 
correlated with age of the respondent. as Individualism is correlated to organizational size and GNP, and Masculinity is 
correlated with the percentage of professional and technical females in the work force. In Baskerville’s view, Hofstede’s 
dimensions could be replicated by simply using a pool of socio-economic data.  
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(1999), cultural values are the shared basis for specific norms that indicate to individuals and 
organizations what is appropriate and preferred in different situations.  Social institutions such as 
schools, organized religion, and economic and political systems set their goals and objectives with 
these cultural restrictions in mind. Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann (2003) propose that institutions 
socialize citizens into the common traditions that hold national communities together. Nations tend to 
create central inclinations among their citizens; therefore, the variability will be larger between 
citizens of different nations than among those within the same nation. Culture as defined per Schwartz 
(1999) is shared abstract ideas about what is good, right and desirable in a society. Culture is then the 
basis for the specific norms that tell individuals and organizations what is appropriate in different 
situations.  
Accordingly, all social institutions (including family, school system, religious establishment, 
and political system) will include and propagate these values in their goals and conduct. As a result, 
cultural dimensions can provide corporate managers, as members of the social institutions, incentives 
or disincentives to the holdings of corporate liquid-assets by imposing an additional cost or benefit to 
the manager-shareholder making the decision.  For example, in an uncertainty-averse society, a 
manager who wants to reduce inventory by adopting a Just In Time (JIT) inventory system may be 
seen as “taking too much risk” and will face higher (perhaps non-pecuniary) costs than a manager in a 
uncertainty- neutral culture.   
 
 
Uncertainty avoidance as a cultural dimension and liquid-asset holdings  
The economics literature has attempted a variety of approaches to empirically measure agents’ 
degree of risk aversion. For example, Kritzman, Lowry and Van Royen (2002) derive a risk aversion   11
coefficient from global portfolio flows and holdings. Relying on the notion of decreasing relative risk 
aversion, Becker (2003) has directly used executive compensation data as a proxy for risk aversion. 
Harlow and Brown (1990) used neurochemical activity in the brain of subjects participating in 
experimental auctions to assess the levels of the enzyme monoamine oxidase, which is believed to 
influence people’s attitudes towards risk.   
Social scientists, however, have taken a different approach; they believe that culture in general 
and risk aversion in particular, can be assessed by measuring individuals’ values and attitudes towards 
specific situations. Research in culture suggests that people’s attitudes and behavior toward risk has a 
social component. Different groups of people (such as a country) may have systematically different 
levels of risk aversion. Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance focuses on the level of tolerance for 
uncertainty and ambiguity within the society (i.e. unstructured situations). According to Hofstede, a 
low ranking indicates that the country has high tolerance for uncertainty, it is less concerned about 
ambiguity and the future and has more tolerance for a variety of opinions. This is reflected in a society 
that allows rule breaking, more readily accepts change, and takes more and greater risks. A high 
uncertainty avoidance ranking indicates the country has low tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. 
This creates a rule-oriented society that institutes laws, rules, regulations, and other controls in order to 
reduce the amount of stress that uncertainty creates in individuals. Managers in countries with high 
values of uncertainty avoidance will be less willing to take risks and will perceive cash as an 
instrument to hedge against future undesired states of nature.   
Managers use a variety of risk-management tools to cope with risks of different types at a 
variety of costs. These hedging tools differ in terms of costs and benefits, the specificity of the risk 
covered and their availability. The most risk-specific tools include financial derivatives and insurance, 
which offer a hedge against a specific undesired state of nature. Other less specific tools include debt 
arrangements such as the use of letters of credit, contingent debt, equity offerings and the holdings of   12
liquid assets. Liquid assets can be considered negative debt which can be quickly deployed when the 
state of nature is not favorable, they can be considered as a very versatile risk management tool. There 
is an opportunity cost to holding liquid assets because of the liquidity premium.  All else equal, risk-
averse firm-managers should hold higher levels of liquid assets. To the extent that an individual’s 
perception of risk and uncertainty as well as her coping mechanisms are significantly influenced by the 
national culture in which the individual resides, we expect managers in countries high on the cultural 
attribute of uncertainty avoidance to hold more liquid assets, on average. Thus, to formalize, we 
propose that:  
H1:  The cash holdings of a firm are positively correlated with the degree of uncertainty 
avoidance of the national culture in which it resides.   
Theories of the multinational firm and liquid-asset holdings  
While culture could explain cross-country variations in corporate liquidity, the effect of 
culture may not be uniform across firms within the same national culture. In addition to the firm-
level determinants of liquidity, the international experience of firms can serve as a moderator of 
the effects of country-specific cultures and may account for the within-culture diversity in 
corporate liquid-asset holdings.    
To begin, the internationalization of firms’ operations would more likely increase the need for 
liquid-asset holdings because it will extend its business cycle.  The need to support export activities 
would require longer terms of credit, less stringent credit policy and maintenance of larger inventories, 
all of which contributes to a higher level of working capital.  In addition, the operation of a complex 
network of subsidiaries tends to increase the number and degree of contingencies that require 
maintaining a larger buffer in the form of, among others, liquid-asset holdings.     13
An alternative hypothesis, suggested in international finance text books is the practice of cash 
pooling by MNCs.  The objective of cash pooling for the multinational firm is to bring together debit 
and credit balances of all subsidiaries. This way the MNC creates an internal capital market that could 
more efficiently allocate resources and thus store a lower amount of liquid assets.  Therefore, the 
answer to this question should be an empirical one. However, cash pooling is a practice also available 
to any mid size and large domestic firm with divisions in different industries or subsidiaries in 
different regions within the country. The practice of cash pooling should be captured with our proxy 
for size. Consider two firms equal in every respect except that one is geographically diversified within 
its own country and the other across countries. We argue that the internationalized firm will face a 
longer and more unpredictable business cycle which will increase their need for liquid assets. For these 
reasons we posit  
H2  Liquid asset holdings of the firm are positively correlated with its degree of 
multinationality;  
On the other hand, multinational corporations learn from and adapt to their diverse foreign 
experiences, which prevent them from excessive influences of only one national culture.  Thus, 
internationalization could also have a moderating role on the effect of national culture on firm 
liquid-asset holdings.  
As the firm begins to trade and expand internationally, managers are provided with 
opportunities to learn other cultures’ “ways of doing things.” This learning could be illustrated by an 
example.  In the first stage, the firm’s international activities are restricted to foreign trade. The 
marketing division is most likely the functional department that has information about foreign markets 
and potential foreign customers. Information from foreign markets may imply that firms need to make 
simple adjustments to meet the new needs. These changes could be product labeling and/or packaging   14
                                                
or adjustment of order sizes that better satisfy customer demands.  Subsequent stages of 
internationalization can lead firms to opening sales subsidiaries abroad, followed by acquiring other 
firms or launching operating facilities. These developments force the firm to deal with evermore 
complex issues such as effective communication with language barriers, and psychic distance that 
influence the management of operations.    
The organizational learning theory developed in Kogut and Zander (1993) and expanded in 
Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) suggest that firms are social communities specializing in the transfer 
of knowledge and that firms operating in diverse national settings can develop a richer knowledge 
structure and stronger technological capabilities than firms that are exposed only to domestic markets. 
As a result, firms and managers that remain in one country will have a less rich pool of experiences 
upon which to base their decisions. Experience is a source of learning, and diverse environments 
increase new ideas and events to which the firm and/or manager are exposed. In this knowledge-based 
framework, the goals and decisions of a purely domestic firm with domestic managers will only reflect 
the values of the society in which it exists. External influences will be restricted to objective 
knowledge
5; these domestic firms will then lack experiential knowledge of foreign markets and 
international competition. Under this isolation, managers and firms will likely incorporate only the 
local culture into their decisions, behavior and processes. Since the opportunity to learn from foreign 
competition is limited, domestic firms can only look inside their countries for examples and guidance.  
The foregoing review suggests that multinational firms are different from domestic firms in 
that they have foreign exposure and experience in operating in multiple cultures. Therefore 
multinational firms have a much richer pool of experiences from which to make their decisions and, 
since the multinational firm is no longer embedded only in the domestic culture, we thus propose:  
 
5 Penrose (1959) proposes two kinds of knowledge: Objective knowledge, which can be taught and, experiential 
knowledge, which can only be acquired through personal experience.  
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H3 The impact of culture as a determinant of corporate liquid asset holdings is lower for 
multinational firms compared to their domestic equivalents.  
Data and analysis  
To examine the veracity of our hypotheses empirically, we assemble detailed data on a large 
panel of firms across forty countries with close to 70 thousand firm-year observations for 1990-2000.  
The firm-level data for the study are obtained from the Worldscope database.  We exclude firms in the 
financial sector (SIC codes 6000 to 6999) because their holdings of liquid assets could be the result of 
government regulation or arise from reasons different from those discussed in the previous sections. 
Other industries excluded for similar reasons are utilities (SIC codes 4300 to 4399) and postal services 
(SIC codes 4900 to 4999). We also exclude firm-years with negative or missing values for sales, total 
assets, cash and short-term investments and working capital.   
Dependent variable  
For the purpose of replication and comparability, most variables in our study have been 
constructed following Opler et al. (1999) and Pinkowitz et al. (2003).  Cash & short-term investments 
(CASH) is our proxy for liquid assets, CASH is measured as the ratio of cash and short term 
investments over the difference between total assets minus cash and short-term investments.  
 
Main explanatory variables  
Our measure of culture is UNCERT, the country level uncertainty avoidance from Hofstede 
(2001) which measures the degree of tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity within society as an 
attribute of its national culture. According to Hofstede, a low uncertainty avoidance ranking reflects a 
society that is less rule-oriented, more readily accepts change, and takes more and greater risks.    16
Countries with low scores in uncertainty avoidance are more tolerant to a changing environment; 
higher values of uncertainty avoidance imply that managers are less willing to take risks and are 
willing to hold more liquid assets in exchange for some risk hedging. In line with our H1, we expect 
this coefficient to be positive and significant indicating that firms in risk averse countries use more 
liquid assets as a hedging tool.  
Foreign sales as a percentage of total sales (FGN_SALES), is the proxy for the degree of 
internationalization of the firm. The higher the percentage of sales generated abroad, the higher degree 
of foreign exposure of the firm. This proxy has been extensively used in international business 
literature. From our H2 we expect this coefficient to be positive which would be indicative of 
multinational firms holding more liquid assets to fulfill their longer business cycle.  
The interaction between multinationality and culture is estimated using FGN SALES X 
UNCERT. From H3, we expect this coefficient to be negative and significant indicating that 
multinationality lowers the impact of culture on corporate liquid asset holdings.    
Firm level controls,  
Growth opportunities (GROWTH), firms with high growth opportunities will be more likely to 
have more projects to invest in. In an asymmetric information framework, managers of these firms 
may find it difficult to convey the real value of the investment opportunity to the debt and equity 
markets and prefer to hold cash as financial slack.  It is expected that GROWTH will be positively 
correlated with liquid asset holdings. GROWTH is calculated as the ratio of market capitalization plus 
total assets plus total liabilities over total assets.   
Firm size (L_ASSETS), large firms have lower information asymmetries compared to small 
firms. It is less costly for large firms to convey information about the real value of their projects so 
they access debt and equity markets to obtain financing. Therefore the relation between liquid asset   17
holdings and firm size should be negative. L_ASSETS is measured as the log of total assets at the end 
of each year.  
Research and development (RD_SALES) can be considered another instance of information 
asymmetries because they represent investments in assets whose values are hard to measure. Firms 
with high R&D expenses are expected to hold more liquid assets. In our study, RD_SALES is 
measured as the ratio of research and development expenses over total sales.   
Cash flow over assets (CF_ASSETS) firms with higher cash flows will be more likely to 
accumulate liquid assets. Agency costs of managerial discretion indicate that entrenched managers 
would prefer to hold liquid assets as a mechanism to avoid oversight by banks and deriving private 
benefits. However, if managers’ goals are in line with those of shareholders, and if the quality of 
institutions is good, they should hold less cash. CFASSETS is estimated as the net cash flow of 
operating activities over the difference of total assets minus cash and short-term investments.   
Capital expenses (CAPEXP), Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that firms save financial slack 
to fund future investment opportunities. For this reason we expect that firms with high levels of 
current investment should have lower levels of liquid assets. CAPEXP is calculated as the ratio of 
additions to fixed assets over total assets.   
Corporate debt (LEVERAGE), firms with high leverage will be subject to monitoring and 
financial covenants from banks and bond holders. In an agency framework managers will prefer to 
have low debt to divert liquid assets to derive private benefit. On the other hand, firms with high 
leverage need liquid resources to service it, therefore it is expected that leverage should be negatively 
correlated with liquid asset holdings, LEVERAGE is calculated as total liabilities over total assets.  
 Net working capital (NWCASSETS), cash is not the only choice of liquidity a firm has, we 
utilize working capital as a control and we expect it to be negatively correlated with our dependant 
variable. NWCASSETS is measured as the ratio of net working capital over net assets. Net working   18
capital is computed as working capital minus cash & short-term investments, while net assets are 
computed as total assets less cash & short-term investments.   
 
Country level controls  
Pinkowitz et al. (2003) argue that the quality of institutions in a country explains corporate 
liquid asset holdings. They use an agency theory approach to suggest that when the quality of 
institutions in a country is low, managers will prefer liquid assets because they can derive private 
benefits from them more easily than non liquid assets. To account for the quality of institutions 
identified in Pinkowitz et al. (2003) we utilize the following country level controls,  
Gross domestic product (GDP) is presented per capita, it proxies and controls for economic 
development. It is expected that liquid asset holdings be positively correlated with GDP. The data was 
obtained from the World Bank files.  
   
Inflation (INFLATION) can be seen as a cost of holding liquid assets and at the same time is a 
proxy for the quality of institutions of the country. Inflation is expected to negatively impact corporate 
holdings of liquid assets. INFLATION is calculated as the yearly average inflation over the period 
1990 through 2000 and the data is obtained from the International Monetary Fund World Outlook 
reports.  
Economic freedom (EFW) is a comprehensive index that measures overall freedom of a 
society. The index measures how well a country scores on a list of 50 independent variables divided 
into 10 broad factors of economic freedom. Low scores are more desirable. The higher the score on a 
factor, the greater the level of government interference in the economy and the less economic freedom 
a country enjoys. It is expected that firms in economies that are free will require lower levels of liquid 
assets. The Economic Freedom of the World Ranking is published annually by The Heritage 
Foundation.     19
 Property Rights (PROP) measures the degree of protection of private property and property 
rights; the extent to which the government respects property rights by enforcing the law; and how safe 
private property is from expropriation.  Managers in countries with low investor protection will prefer 
liquid assets because they can appropriate then easier. It is expected that countries with better property 
rights protection should hold lower levels of liquid assets. This variable is also obtained from the 
Economic Freedom of the World reports.  
Quality of the banking system (BANK) refers to the quality of the banking system measured by 
the government involvement in the financial sector; more regulations would imply lower freedom. It is 
expected that firms in countries with low quality banking system will hold more liquid assets as a 
precautionary measure. This variable is also obtained from the Economic Freedom of the World 
reports.  
Legal system (CIVIL LAW), the influence of legal systems as an explanatory variable is 
controlled for using a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the country has a civil law system.  
Countries with civil law system have also been described as being bank oriented (instead of market 
oriented). It is expected that firms in civil law countries hold lower levels of liquid assets. The data for 
this variable was obtained from LLSV (1998).   
Country risk (COUNTRY RISK), firms in countries with high political risk should hold higher 
levels of liquid assets. COUNTRY RISK is obtained from the rankings of Coface.    
Corruption (CORRUPTION) Pinkowitz et al. (2003) propose that when corruption is high, 
firms face the need to pay off functionaries and need to have liquid assets available. In this case 
managers will hold high levels of liquid assets. An alternative view, proposed here, suggests that 
companies recognize that in an environment of corruption managers’ discretion should be limited. If 
this were the case, firms should have lower levels of liquid assets to “avoid temptation”. CORRU is 
the corruption index published by Transparency International.      20
                                                
Table II presents summary statistics of the key variables by country; the first column shows the 
count of firm-year observations. As expected, developed countries contribute more firms to our 
sample.  The United States has the largest number of firms in the sample accounting for 28% of both 
the overall sample. The second largest country in the overall sample is Japan with 9,589 firm year 
observations, amounting to 14%. The second column shows the count of firm-year observations of a 
subsample comprised of companies reporting foreign sales greater than zero. The United States, 
United Kingdom, Germany and Japan combined account for almost 46% percent of this subsample. It 
is clear from the table that some countries have a greater proportion of multinational firms than others. 
The third column of Table II shows the proportion of internationalized firms in each country. Over 
60% of the firms in small developed countries like Austria, Netherlands and Switzerland are 
international. On the other hand small underdeveloped countries have fewer than 5% of their firms 
being internationals
6
.  
Column four of Table II shows the levels of cash held in each country which vary widely. 
Firms from Norway and Sweden hold on average cash ratios greater than 0.3 while firms in Portugal 
and New Zealand on average hold a ratio of 0.05   
Table II also illustrates in column five, that our proxy for culture levels also varies widely; 
Belgium, Japan, Poland and Portugal are amongst the countries with the highest values for UNCERT 
while Denmark, Sweden, Hong Kong and Singapore are the countries with the lowest values.  Column 
six shows the mean foreign sales by country. It can be seen that while a significant portion of US firms 
(34%) are selling abroad, their level of internationalization is not very high (12%). On the other hand, 
only 29% of Norwegian firms sell abroad but their foreign sales comprise 56% of total sales. Columns 
 
6 One potential limitation of the dataset is that, because of different disclosure standards and reporting requirements 
amongst countries, some firms may choose to not report foreign sales. A common problem in databases is that recent years 
tend to have more information than older years. As time passes more and more firms are reporting their foreign sales 
information. To control for this possible bias, we have run the analysis restricting the data to the 1995 – 2000 period and 
the results presented in this paper are unaltered.  
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seven through thirteen show the mean values for our control variables.    
We can further our understanding of our sample by reading table III which presents the 
Pearson correlation coefficients for selected variables. This preliminary evidence seems to be in 
disagreement with our H1, the correlation between UNCERT and CASH is negative. In the case of our 
H2, the correlation between CASH and FGN SALES is positive yet insignificant. In line with theory 
and previous evidence, the correlations between CASH and the proxies for information asymmetry 
(GROWTH, L_ASSETS, and RDSALES) have the expected signs. The same can be said of the 
proxies for quality of institutions, (such GDP and INFLATION).  
 
Regression Results  
To examine the relations between culture, multinationality and liquid-asset holdings that are 
emerging from the data while controlling for other known determinants, we estimate regression 
equations of the following form:  
 
CASH ict =α +β1UNCERT c +β 2 FGN _ SALES ict + β3 FGN _ SALESxUNCERT ict +β 4 FIRM ict + eict 
(1) 
 
 where the subscript ict refers to firm, country and year respectively  
The FIRM control variables are used in Opler et al. (1999) as firm-level determinants. For 
robustness, the model is estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments obtaining Newey West 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix and fixed industry and year 
effects.  
Table IV shows the results of estimating equation 1, panel A includes all the firm-year 
observations in our sample. Consistent with our hypotheses, the higher the uncertainty avoidance a 
country exhibits, the higher the holdings of liquid assets, holding all other determinants constant. 
After controlling for all firm level determinants of cash holdings, culture matters: managers in   22
countries high on uncertainty avoidance hold more liquid assets than those in countries lower on 
uncertainty avoidance.   
Panel B of Table IV shows the results of estimating equation 1 using the sub sample of firm-
years with foreign sales greater or equal to zero and greater than zero respectively. This specification 
allows testing the impact of multinationality (H2) and its interaction with culture (H3) as determinant 
of liquid holdings. The impact of culture is robust to this new specification. From the table, it can be 
seen that the coefficient for UNCERT remains positive and significant. Furthermore, consistent with 
our hypothesis, the coefficient of FGN SALES is positive and significant both statistically and 
economically. A one standard deviation change in multinationality corresponds to a 3% change in the 
holdings of liquid assets. The more a firm exports, the higher the need for liquid holdings. Intuitively, 
items such as receivables and inventory are likely to be higher for firms engaged in foreign trade, 
resulting in higher overall liquid-asset holdings.   
Finally, consistent with our hypothesis (H3), the coefficient on the interaction of FGN 
SALES and UNCERT is negative and significant.  This finding is consistent with our proposition 
that as firms become international, they “learn” and adopt best practices regardless of their country of 
origin, managers begin comparing their performance on a global scale rather than simply locally. 
This learning makes the manager of the firm less subject to the influence of his or her culture.   
Different reporting disclosure requirements in different countries could introduce a bias in our 
sample. Companies reporting foreign sales as zero may not be any different from those firms that 
simply do not report this information. For this reason, the same model is estimated for the sub sample 
of firms with foreign sales strictly greater than zero. Results are not materially different from those of 
the overall sample. Panel C of Table IV shows the results for this specification. It can be seen that for 
this sub sample, our results hold. Culture (uncertainty avoidance) is an economically and statistically 
significant determinant of the liquid holdings of firms. This influence, however, is diminished by the   23
                                                
degree of multinationality of the firm.    
These results are both statistically and economically significant. From the model in panel C, a 
one standard deviation change in the uncertainty avoidance implies a 5% change in the holdings of 
liquid assets of the firm. These results are also robust to the proxy used for liquid assets. Results not 
reported here reveal the same findings using NWC_ASSETS as the proxy for liquid assets instead of 
CASH
7. The coefficients for parameters of the other controls are in line with those of identified in 
Opler et al. (1999)
8.  
Due to the nature of the data, some degree of heteroskedasticity is expected, for this reason a 
White test was performed on the regression and the results suggest that the hypothesis of no 
heteroskedasticity cannot be rejected. Consequently, a White consistent variance covariance matrix is 
calculated and used to test whether the coefficient on UNCERT = coefficient on FGN SALES = 
coefficient on FGN SALES X UNCERT = 0.  The results suggest that the null hypothesis can be 
strongly rejected in all cases.    
As suggested by Pinkowitz et al. (2003), country specific institutional variables such as country 
risk and corruption are significant predictors of liquid asset holdings. It is possible that the results 
presented so far arise simply because we do not control for institutional variables or because the proxy 
for uncertainty avoidance measures these country institutions and not what it is intended to measure. In 
order to test this we estimate the following equation  
CASH ict =α+β1UNCERT c +β 2 FGN _ SALES ict +β3 FGN _ SALESxUNCERT ict +   
β 4 FIRM ict +β5COUNTRY c +β6COUNTRY ct + eict        ( 2 )  
 
7 In fact, the economic significance of culture increases when using net working capital as a proxy for liquid assets. 
A one standard deviation change in UNCERT implies a eight percent change in NWC_ASSETS.  
 
8 It is important to note that the coefficient for CF_ASSETS is negative for the whole sample while positive our 
subsample of strictly international firms.  
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In Table V, we explore the relations between cash, culture and multinationality, controlling for 
country specific institutional variables. Pinkowitz et al. (2003) estimate their model using one 
institutional proxy at a time. We estimate our model differently; we believe that the model is 
misspecified unless all proxies for quality of institutions are included at the same time. While 
undoubtedly some proxies will be correlated, in essence they try to measure distinct aspects of the 
quality of the institutions of a country.  We use a number of proxies for the quality of institutions in 
estimating the basic model. Since by construction, low values of FREEDOM, PROP and BANK 
indicate better institutions, we expect positive coefficients. Low values of CORRUPTION and 
COUNTRY RISK indicate poor institutions so we expect a negative coefficient for these variables.   
Table V confirms that our main results are robust after controlling for institutional quality of 
countries.  The coefficients of UNCERT and FGN SALES are significantly positive, while the 
interaction term is robustly negative.  Turning to the institutional variables, the results are in general 
consistent with the evidence presented in Pinkowitz et al. (2003). However, two important distinctions 
should be made. The coefficients for INFLATION and CORRUPTION are positive and significant. 
Additionally our proxy for COUNTRY RISK is insignificant. There is only mixed evidence that firms 
residing in countries with good institutions (regardless of how we measure the quality of institutions) 
hold less liquid assets on average.    
Robustness Tests  
To rule out potential mechanical explanations of the results reported so far, we provide a series 
of robustness tests in this section.  First, a concern one may have about the data is the possibility of 
multicolliniearity among the right-hand variables that could blur the interpretation of the coefficient 
estimates. For this reason we perform a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test, the results of which are 
not reported here.  All values for VIF are smaller than 10, including those of the interaction of   25
uncertainty avoidance and foreign sales. These results suggest that none of the variables should be 
dropped in the regressions.  Additionally, we perform procedures of maximum R-square and Mallow’s 
Cp. These tests, although not reported here, suggest that uncertainty avoidance and foreign sales have 
more explanatory power over cash holdings than some of the variables suggested by Opler et al. 
(1999).   
Second, in order to account for all possible firm specific sources of variation in liquid-asset 
holdings we perform an in between estimation of our model. We calculate the means over time for all 
relevant variables by firm and then estimate equation 2 for the overall sample as well as for the sub 
samples of multinational firms using GMM with Newey West robust errors. The results shown on 
Table VI are consistent with those reported in Tables IV and V, namely that uncertainty avoidance and 
multinationality are positively and significantly correlated with the firm’s holdings of liquid assets. 
Furthermore, the results confirm that the effects of culture are moderated by multinationality.    
One potential issue that could be driving the results of estimating our models is the endogeneity 
of CASH and NWCASSETS. These variables represent two forms of liquidity and are hardly 
independent. For this reason we estimate the following system of equations,  
 
CASH =α1 +β1 FGNSALES ict +φ1UNCERT c +ϕ1 FGNSALESxUNCERT ict +γ 1 X ict + e1ict 
(3) 
NWCASSETS =α 2 +β 2 FGNSALES ict +φ2UNCERT c +ϕ 2 FGNSALESxUNCERT ict +γ 2 X ict + e2ict 
 
where X is a vector of firm and country level controls. Results for CASH are presented in 
Table VII and are in accordance with the evidence presented so far. Culture and the degree of 
internationalization are important determinants of cash holdings. At the same time their 
interaction moderates the impact of culture. Additionally, in this specification the coefficient 
for CFASSETS becomes positive, providing support to the agency cost of managerial   26
discretion interpretation.  It can be claimed the firms in more volatile environments should 
hold more cash.  
If this is true, our results may be more related to the uncertainty of the environment than with 
culture. To control for this possibility we create a new variable, GDP growth volatility, calculated as 
the standard deviation of the growth of GDP.  Table VIII Panel A shows the results of estimating 
equation 2 including our proxy for the uncertainty of the environment. As expected, the volatility of 
the economic environment is positively correlated with cash holdings. However, uncertainty avoidance 
remains significant, hence our findings are again robust to this new specification. Finally, Mansi and 
Reeb (2002) have questioned (using capital structure as dependant variable) the assumption of 
linearity in the relation between the degree of internationalization and the firms’ financial decisions. 
Our results could be driven by our failure to incorporate this possibility. Table VIII Panel B 
incorporates the square of foreign sales a robustness control. The coefficient for this proxy is negative 
indicating that as firms reach high levels of internationalization they reduce their cash holdings.  
Summary and conclusions  
What explains the cross-sectional variations in liquid-asset holdings across firms and 
countries?  The paper provides explanations based on differences in national culture and differences in 
firms’ degree of internationalization.  We develop several hypotheses of how culture and 
multinationality interact to influence corporate holdings of liquid assets, controlling for all other 
known determinants.  Firms residing in countries that are high on uncertainty avoidance, as a cultural 
attribute, would hold more liquid assets, as would firms with high degree of internationalization 
because of their longer business cycle.  On the other hand, the impact of national culture on firm 
liquidity is moderated by the degree of the firm’s multinationality.   
We examine empirically the relations among national culture, multinationality and corporate   27
liquid-asset holdings using data on a large panel of firms across 40 countries for the period 1990 
through 2000.  We find strong evidence consistent with our hypotheses. We find that both national 
culture and the degree of internationalization of the firm are economically and statistically significant 
predictors of firms’ liquid asset holdings. Firms in countries with high uncertainty avoidance hold 
more cash. A one standard deviation change in the uncertainty avoidance index across countries 
produces an 5 percent increase in liquid assets holdings. Moreover, we find that multinationality 
moderates the effects of national culture on liquid-asset holdings. The predictive power of national 
culture as an explanatory variable of liquid-asset holdings decreases with the degree of 
internationalization of the firm.   
The paper makes a number of contributions. First, based on a detailed cross-country panel, we 
identify and document that, in addition to the firm-level determinants of liquidity, national culture 
explains a significant portion of the cross-country variations in liquidity.  Second, against the 
commonly held view that cash pooling would reduce cash holdings, we report that multinational firms 
hold more cash than their domestic counterparts. Third, the paper identifies the degree of 
internationalization of the firm as a potential determinant of its liquidity that moderates the enduring 
effects of national culture on firm’s liquid-asset holdings.  Fourth, we provide evidence that after 
controlling for the internationalization of the firm, previous findings on the quality of institutions of a 
country do not seem to hold. Finally, we introduce an interdisciplinary perspective in understanding 
firm’s decisions on liquidity, linking the literatures in finance, culture and the theories of the 
multinational firm.  
The findings of the paper provide important implications for future research. While the 
evidence indicates that culture affects corporate financial decisions, it also underscores that national 
culture does not affect all firms in the same way. The impact of national culture seems to be more   28
pronounced for firms with less foreign exposure. The implication is that the effects of culture on the 
financial decisions of the firm should take into account the moderating effects of multinationality.  The 
evidence that multinational firms’ decisions are different from domestic firms’ implies that cross-
country studies on corporate behavior should properly account for the impacts of firms’ degree of 
internationalization.    29
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